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This paper demonstrates that the role of the personal income distribution for
an economy￿s process of development through risky human capital accumulation
critically depends on the shape of the saving function. Empirical evidence for the
U.S. strongly suggests that the marginal propensity to save is increasing in in-
come, a property which so far has not been allowed for in the literature on human
capital, income distribution and macroeconomics. Doing so, the present analysis
suggests that the impact of higher inequality on the aggregate human capital
stock, and thus, on growth is positive under rather weak conditions. Results
heavily rely on a positive impact of parents￿ income on children￿s human capital
investments, which holds under standard assumptions on labor income risk and
risk aversion in the model, and is largely supported by empirical evidence.
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01I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper analyzes the interaction between intergenerational wealth transmission, hu-
man capital investments under uninsurable labor income risk, and economic growth in
a small open overlapping-generations economy with heterogeneous agents. It demon-
strates how the role of the personal income distribution for an economy￿s process of
development through risky human capital accumulation depends on the shape of the
saving function. The analysis suggests that when the marginal propensity to save
(MPS) is increasing in income, the impact of higher inequality on the aggregate human
capital stock and thus on growth is positive under rather weak conditions during the
transition to a stationary equilibrium.
This result is novel to the literature on human capital, income distribution and
macroeconomics, which so far has exclusively focussed on utility speci￿cations which
imply a non-increasing MPS (albeit a non-decreasing average propensity to save). How-
ever, empirical evidence strongly suggests that the MPS is increasing (not only in cur-
rent but also in permanent income). For instance, in a recent paper, Dynan et al.
(2004) show that this saving pattern is prevalent for the U.S. economy, allowing for
various measures of savings and diﬀerent time periods (see also Menchik and David,
1983, and Dynan et al., 2002, for similar evidence).
The mechanisms of the model heavily rely on a positive impact of parents￿ income
on children￿s human capital investments, which holds under standard assumptions on
labor income risk and risk aversion in the model. More speci￿cally, individuals face
idiosyncratic and nondiversi￿able risk, like those associated with labor demand shocks
for speci￿c skills (e.g., Wildasin, 2000), health and disability risk, uncertainty about
the quality of schooling, and uncertainty associated with social factors like the access
to social networks.1 Indeed, empirical studies ￿nd a positive and substantial eﬀect
1The hypothesis that uninsurable labor income risk systematically aﬀects incentives of risk-averse
individuals to invest in human capital has received surprisingly little attention in the growth literature.
See Gould et al. (2001), BØnabou (2002) and Krebs (2003) for notable exceptions, which, however,
deal with diﬀerent questions. Gould et al. (2001) are concerned with the evolution of wage inequality
and its interaction with the rate of technical progress and its variance across sectors. BØnabou (2002)
1of parents￿ income on human capital investments, even after controlling for parents￿
education, occupation and ability of both children and parents (e.g., Taubman, 1989;
Sacerdote, 2002; Plug and Vijverberg, 2003).
The question how the personal income distribution aﬀects an economy￿s process of
development has stimulated the more recent macroeconomic theory and growth em-
pirics like almost no other one (for a survey, see e.g. Aghion et al., 1999). Whereas
empirical evidence is mixed,2 in their pioneering theoretical contribution, Galor and
Zeira (1993) show that inequality typically has an adverse eﬀect on the process of de-
velopment if credit markets are imperfect (￿credit-market imperfections approach￿).
This is because poor individuals cannot borrow suﬃciently high amounts to ￿nance
an indivisible level of schooling investments in their model.3 Galor and Moav (2004)
provide an important contribution for understanding historical development processes.
They argue that inequality and growth are positively related in early stages of devel-
opment when physical capital accumulation is the prime engine of growth. But when
the return to capital falls over time, such that human capital investments become more
attractive, the relationship between inequality and growth turns negative under bind-
ing borrowing constraints for the poor, as in Galor and Zeira (1993). In contrast to
the credit-market imperfections approach, the positive relationship between parent￿s
examines the trade-oﬀs of progressive income taxation for growth and eﬃciency, whereas Krebs (2003)
studies the impact of labor income risk on growth in a framework with ex ante identical agents.
2Earlier empirical evidence suggests a negative link between inequality and growth (e.g., Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabillini, 1994; Perotti, 1996). Using a new and comprehensive high-
quality data set which allows to study panels, Deininger and Squire (1998) and Banerjee and Du￿o
(2003) ￿nd practically none, whereas Li and Zou (1998) and Forbes (2000) report a positive relation-
ship.Allowing for a non-linear impact of inequality on GDP growth, Barro (2000) ￿nds a negative
relationship for developing countries and a positive relationship for more advanced countries. Finally,
Banerjee and Du￿o (2003) suggest that the change in inequality, in either direction, rather then its
level is negatively associated with growth. Moreover, on basis of this ￿nding, they argue that previous
panel studies (particularly those relying on ￿xed eﬀects) may have produced upward biased estimates
of the eﬀect of inequality on growth.
3As shown by BØnabou (1996) and Moav (2002), a negative relationship between inequaliy and
growth can also be obtained by replacing this non-convexity in the education technology by the
assumption of diminishing marginal returns to human capital investment. This implies that the
aggregate human capital stock increases if educational investment is spread more equally. Another
strand of literature deals with the role of imperfect capital markets for the relationship between wealth
distribution and entrepreneurship, when project sizes (i.e., required physical capital investments to
become entrepreneur) are ￿xed (e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1991, 1993; Aghion and Bolton, 1997).
2income and educational investment in the present model does not rely on individual
constraints to borrow for educational investment. The proposed alternative micro-
foundation based on labor income risk is consistent with the observation that family
income is an important determinant of educational attainment even in advanced coun-
tries, where extensive provisions of college ￿nancial aid (like in the U.S.) or public
education ￿nance (prevalent in Europe) is supposed to remove credit constraints for
human capital investments for the bulk of individuals. In fact, recent studies ￿nd no
evidence for the relevance of educational borrowing constraints in the U.S. (see e.g.
Cameron and Taber, 2004, and the references therein).4
Besides in the credit-market imperfections approach, it has been argued that high
inequality is adversely related to growth because it induces high demand for redistrib-
utive taxation in the political process (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and
Tabellini, 1994), high fertility (e.g., Perotti, 1996), high social instability (e.g., Venieris
and Gupta, 1986; Alesina and Perotti, 1996), low aggregate demand for R&D-intensive
products (Zweim￿ller, 2000), and a low degree of the specialization of labor (Fishman
and Simhon, 2002). In contrast, the classical view has suggested that wealth inequal-
ity is positively related to (investment-driven) growth. The foundation of this view by
Bourguignon (1981) shows that under an increasing MPS, unegalitarian stable equi-
libria are even Pareto superior to an egalitarian stable equilibrium in the neoclassical
growth model of Stiglitz (1969). The reason for this result is that physical capital ac-
cumulation, fueled by domestic savings, raises wages such that growth ￿trickles down￿
to less wealthy individuals.
This paper shows that the prediction of a positive inequality-growth relationship
and a vital role of an increasing MPS, as hypothesized by the classical view, basically
carries over when growth is driven by human capital accumulation (under idiosyncratic
human capital risk) - albeit the mechanism is diﬀerent. The analysis demonstrates that
even in a small open economy, in which national savings are unrelated to physical cap-
4Of course, this does not mean that borrowing constraints play a minor role for developing countries
as well.
3ital investment (thus excluding the ￿trickle-down￿ mechanism in e.g. Bourguignon,
1981), the relationship between inequality and an economy￿s the process of develop-
ment critically depends on intergenerational wealth transmission and thus on savings
behavior. According to the model, adults save in order to bequeath or to make inter
vivos gifts, respectively,5 and intergenerational transfers are optimally allocated to hu-
man capital investments and savings for future wealth of the young.6 The idea of the
theory proposed in this paper is that, with an increasing MPS, a decrease in inequality
implies an average reduction in wealth transmission of the rich which may outweigh
the average increase in wealth transmission of the poor. Consequently, if educational
investments are increasing in family wealth, aggregate human capital investment may
fall. Although some contributions have demonstrated that the relationship between
inequality and human capital-based growth can be positive when there are poverty
traps (e.g., Perotti, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Moav, 2002),7 this paper shows
that higher inequality may foster development even in advanced countries under em-
pirically well-supported conditions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the
model. Section 3 analyzes individual education and saving decisions. Section 4 ex-
amines the role of inequality for aggregate income dynamics. Section 5 discusses the
main hypotheses which drive the results of this paper in the light of empirical evidence.
The last section concludes. All proofs and an illustrative example are relegated to an
appendix.
5Such a ￿joy of giving￿ saving motive has received strong empirical support. See Carroll (2000)
for an illuminating discussion of the empirical evidence.
6Thus overlapping-generations structure of the model builds on Galor and Moav (2004), as dis-
cussed in more detail below.
7For instance, if capital markets are imperfect and borrowing constraints are binding even for the
rich (i.e., in very poor countries), redistribution to the rich enables more individuals to ￿nance educa-
tion (e.g., Perotti, 1993; Moav, 2002). Moreover, Galor and Tsiddon (1997) argue that for relatively
poor economies, equality in the distribution of human capital may be an impediment to prosperity in
the longer run under two conditions: ￿rst, the individuals￿ level of human capital positively depends
on the parental level of human capital and, second, technological progress depends on the average
level of human capital in the economy.
42T h e M o d e l
Consider a small open overlapping-generations economy with uninsurable risk of edu-
cational investments.
2.1 Production of Final Output
In every period, a single homogenous consumption good is produced according to a
neoclassical, constant-returns-to-scale production technology. Output at time t, Yt,i s
Yt = F(Kt,H t) ≡ Htf(kt),k t ≡ Kt/Ht, (1)
where Kt and Ht are the amounts of physical capital and human capital employed
in period t, the latter being measured in eﬃciency units. f(•) is a strictly monotonic




Output is sold to the world market in a perfectly competitive environment, with
output price normalized to unity. The gross rate of return to capital, Rt,i si n t e r -
nationally given and time-invariant, i.e., Rt = ﬂ R.T h u s , p r o ￿t maximization of the
representative ￿rm in any period t implies that kt is given by ﬂ R − 1=f0(kt).T h u s ,
kt =( f0)−1( ﬂ R−1) ≡ ﬂ k. Consequently, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of human cap-
ital, wt,r e a d swt = f(ﬂ k) − ﬂ kf0(ﬂ k) ≡ ﬂ w.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c eYt = Htf(ﬂ k) in this economy,
Yt (i.e., the gross domestic product) grows at the same rate as the aggregate human
capital stock Ht.8
2.2 Individuals and Education Technology
In each period, there is a unit mass of individuals with two-period lives. In the ￿rst
period, individuals live by their parents and devote their entire time to acquire edu-
cation. In the second period (adulthood), individuals supply their eﬃciency units of
8The capital-skill complementarity underlying production function (1) is empirically well sup-
ported; see e.g. Goldin and Katz (1998). This technology is common in the literature on income
distribution, human capital and growth.
5human capital to the labor market, and allocate their income between consumption and
transfers to their oﬀspring (i.e., bequests or inter vivos transfers, respectively). Inter-
generational transfers (i.e., savings of adults) are optimally allocated (either by parent
or child) between human capital investment and savings of the young for future wealth.9
Individuals are identical with respect to their preferences and their ability to acquire
human capital, but may diﬀer in family wealth. So far, this overlapping-generations
structure follows Galor and Moav (2004). However, in contrast to their model, individ-
uals face idiosyncratic human capital risk,10 which is uninsurable (e.g. Arrow, 1971).11
As will become apparent below, this implies a positive relationship between human
capital investments and parental income under empirically well-supported conditions.
Moreover, to focus the analysis, suppose that individuals can freely borrow for edu-
cational purposes, e.g., due to public provision of ￿nancial college aid. This is not
to deny that educational borrowing constraints are generally unimportant, although
empirical evidence suggest that this is indeed the case in the U.S. (e.g. Cameron and
Taber, 2004). However, when binding, they would just give an additional source for
a positive relationship between educational investment and family wealth (for poorer
households).
An individual i born in period t (a member i of generation t) with investment ei
t






eﬃciency units of human capital. ￿ a is a random variable which follows an i.i.d. process
and is drawn each period from a (cumulative) distribution function Φ(￿ a) with support
9Human capital investments can be thought of both schooling and nonschooling forms of training.
10That is, the analysis employs the standard assumption that human capital investment is riskier
than physical capital investment (Krebs, 2003). First, human capital risk is nondiversi￿able since
embodied in individuals, whereas diversi￿ed portfolios of ￿nancial capital can be held. Second, many
forms of ￿nancial assets in advanced countries are indeed almost risk-free (e.g. government bonds).
11The present model also diﬀers to Galor and Moav (2004) in that our small open economy assump-
tion deliberately excludes the feedback mechanism from aggregate savings to factor prices (which
underlies the results in Bourguignon, 1981) and preferences (speci￿ed below) allow for an increasing
MPS.
6A =[ a,ﬂ a] ⊂ R. The random shock realizes after investment decisions are made, i.e., at
the end of the ￿rst period of life. The function h(e,a) ful￿lls the following properties.
A1. For all a ∈ A, he(e,a) > 0, hee(e,a) ≤ 0, ha(e,a) > 0, hea(e,a) > 0.
(he denotes the ￿rst partial derivative of h with respect to e,e t c . )hee ≤ 0 implies
that expected marginal returns to educational investment are non-increasing. The
analysis explicitly allows for the case of non-diminishing returns to scholling, consistent
with evidence from standard Mincer estimates. (See section 5.3 for a brief discussion.)12
Moreover, given that ha > 0, which merely serves as a convention, one can verify
(available on request) that hea > 0 implies that the variance of earnings increases with
human capital investment e.13 This assumption is well-supported empirically, see e.g.
Levhari and Weiss (1974) and, more recently, Pereira and Martins (2002, 2004).14
Denote by si
t and bi
t the amount of savings invested in the ￿nancial market and the



























t of member i of generation t is given by a function u which is de￿ned over
12This is not to deny that the return to schooling is ultimately diminishing due to physical con-
straints of human brain capacity, as sometimes argued in the literature. The relevant question,
however, is whether this applies at the relevant range.
13A similar type of risk also underlies the model of BØnabou (2002). There are other notions of labor
income risk. For instance, Gould et al. (2001) argue that an increasing variance of sectoral shocks
increase educational attainment of workers because general education reduces the costs of moving
across sectors.
14In contrast, if hea < 0 for all a, in addition to ha > 0,t h e nt h ev a r i a n c eo fﬂ wh(e,￿ a) would
decrease with e. To illustrate the intution for an increasing variance of earnings in the data, suppose
that there are two groups of individuals: a highly educated individual from the ￿rst group earns $9,000
with probability 1/2 and $11,000 with 1/2, whereas a less educated individual from the other group
earns $1 with probability 1/2 and $1,999 with 1/2. Although most would agree that income from the
latter type is riskier than that of the former (with a percentage ￿uctuation around the mean of 99.9
compared to 10 percent), the earnings variance of less educated individuals is lower (9992 compared
to 10002). Thus, the increasing variance property employed here is consistent with the notion that
less educated workers face considerably higher risk under various notions of risk.
7consumption ci
t+1 as an adult and transfer bi








A2. uc > 0, ub > 0, ucc < 0, uccubb − (ucb)2 > 0, ucb ≥ 0 and limI→∞ uc(I,0) <
limI→∞ ub(I,0).
According to assumption A2, u is strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave,
which, as will become apparent below, implies risk aversion of individuals. Moreover,
the latter two relations in A2 imply normality (for income levels which exceed some
threshold) of intergenerational transfers, bi
t+1, which is the empirically relevant case.
Note that, in order to study the role of savings behavior for the relationship between
inequality and growth, no particular functional form on utility is imposed.15
Finally, assume that there are two groups of dynasties in the initial period t =0 .
Af r a c t i o nλ ∈ (0,1) of (￿rich￿) young individuals in t =0receives a transfer bR
0 > 0
and a fraction 1 − λ of (￿poor￿) individuals receives a transfer bP
0 ∈ [0,b R
0 ) from their
parent. Thus, in the aggregate, an amount B0 ≡ λbR
0 +(1−λ)bP
0 is initially transferred.
Adult individuals possess an aggregate human capital stock H0 in the initial period,
i.e., initial output is Y0 = H0f(ﬂ k).16
3 Individual Decisions
Note that income Ii
t+1 = I(bi
t,e i
t,￿ a) of an adult member i of generation t is a random
variable ex ante, but is known in period t+1(i.e., after realization of the shock) when
15Allowing for diﬀerent types of saving behavior by employing a non-parametric utility function
follows Bourguignon (1981).
16Introducing endogenous growth, e.g. by assuming that the aggregate human capital stock Ht
enters the education technology as positive externality (following Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992, among
others), i.e., letting hi
t+1 = h(ei
t,￿ a,Ht), does not alter the main insights of this paper. The main focus
lies on the impact of initial inequality (in t =0 )o ns u b s e q u e n tg r o w t ha v e r a g e do v e ral o n g e rp e r i o d
(i.e. on Yt/Y0−1, and thus on Yt, t ≥ 1), as usually examined in the empirical literature on inequality
and growth. Introducing endogenous growth through human capital accumulation simply implies that
initial inequality also aﬀects the period-by-period growth rate Yt/Yt−1 − 1 in a qualitatively similar
fashion as Yt both during the transition to a stationary equilibrium and in the long run.
8allocating income to consumption and transfer to her oﬀspring. The budget constraint
of such an individual in t +1reads ci
t+1 + bi
t+1 ≤ Ii
t+1. Thus, under the additional
constraint bi













b(I) is called ￿saving function￿ (as bi
t+1 equals forgone consumption of an adult) and
has the following properties. (All results are proven in Appendix A.)
Lemma 1. Under A2, there exists an income level I ≥ 0 such that b(Ii
t+1) > 0
and b0(Ii
t+1) > 0 for all Ii
t+1 >I.
Lemma 1 shows that savings are increasing in income above a threshold income
level. How the MPS, b0(I),i sa ﬀected by income, however, is generally ambiguous. To
demonstrate how the dynamical system depends on the shape of the saving function,
the following analysis will distinguish between the cases b00 ≤ 0 and b00 > 0.I t i s
important to note the diﬀerence between b00 > 0 on the one hand and an increasing
average propensity of adults to save (which holds if b(I)/I is increasing in I)o nt h e
other hand. For instance, following Galor and Zeira (1993), Moav (2002) and Galor
and Moav (2004), among others, consider the saving function b(I)=δ[I − ϑ] if I>ϑ
and b(I)=0otherwise, δ > 0, ϑ ≥ 0.17 Thus, if I ≥ ϑ > 0, the average propensity of
adults to save, b(I)/I = δ − ϑ/I,i si n c r e a s i n gi nI. However, as will become apparent
below, since b00(I)=0for I>ϑ, this particular functional form rules out a potentially
positive eﬀect of inequality on growth during the transition to the stationary state. In
contrast, for instance, suppose u(c,b)=αc−βc2 +lnb, an example which is discussed
for illustrative purposes in more detail in Appendix B. It is easy to verify that, in
addition to Lemma 1, b00 > 0 holds for all I ≥ 0(= I) (as long as uc > 0) under this
utility speci￿cation, i.e., the MPS is strictly increasing in income. (See section 5.1 for
a discussion of empirical evidence on saving behavior.)
17This can be derived by assuming that utility takes the form u(c,b)=( 1− δ)lnc + δln(γ + b),
γ ≥ 0, 0 < δ < 1,w h e r eϑ ≡ γ(1 − δ)/δ.
9From the optimal allocation of income earned as an adult, we can derive the fol-










Lemma 2. Under A2. v(I) is a strictly monotonic increasing and strictly concave
function.
According to Lemma 2, individuals are risk-averse. Throughout the remainder of
the paper, the assumption of ￿decreasing absolute risk aversion￿ is maintained, which
has gained overwhelming empirical support.18
A3. A(I) ≡− v00(I)/v0(I) is strictly decreasing in I.
An amount of transfers bi
t received by a member i of generation t is allocated to sav-
ings for future wealth, si
t (with a safe gross rate of return ﬂ R), and the risky investment
in education, ei








where E is the expectation operator. Thus, using (3), the optimal human capital





















For simplicity, the analysis exclusively focusses on an interior solution of this optimiza-
tion problem. One can then derive the following result.
Proposition 1. (Human capital investment). Under A1 and A3, if ei
t > 0,t h e
human capital investment is strictly increasing in family wealth, i.e., e0(bi
t) > 0.
18Decreasing absolute risk aversion is consistent with observed behavior in the context of portfolio
decisions in ￿nancial markets (e.g. Carroll, 2002), occupational choice, demand for insurance and
other household decisions (e.g. Gollier, 2001). In an interesting empirical study, Guiso and Paiella
(2001) present survey evidence which clearly rejects the hypothesis that the degree of absolute risk
aversion is non-decreasing.
10Proposition 1 coincides with a result derived in the pioneering work on risky edu-
cation by Levhari and Weiss (1974), who consider a two-period model with exogenous
wealth. (See also Eaton and Rosen, 1980.) The intuition for the result is the following.
Under convention ha > 0, the assumption hea > 0 implies that risk (i.e., the variance
of earnings) is increasing with the level of investment in human capital. In contrast,
investing in physical capital (i.e., ￿nancial assets) is risk-free. Hence, if the degree of
absolute risk aversion, A(I), is decreasing in income I, such that A(Ii
t+1)=A(I(bi
t,•,•))
is decreasing in bi
t, then individuals with larger bi
t invest more in risky education.
Proposition 1 is well-supported empirically even in advanced economies in which
credit constraints seem to play a negligible role for human capital investments.19 (See
section 5.2 for a brief review of empirical evidence.) There is neither a theoretical
prediction nor (to my knowledge) empirical evidence, however, on how the marginal
propensity to invest in education, e0(bi
t), changes with bi
t.20 The following assumption
focusses the analysis on the critical hypotheses in this paper (in addition to Proposition
1), i.e., the relationship between earnings and human capital investments on the one
hand and the shape of the saving function, b(I), on the other hand.
A4. The impact of a change in family wealth bi
t on the magnitude of the marginal
propensity to invest in education is negligible, i.e., |e00(bi
t)| ≈ 0 for all bi
t ∈ R+.
The role of Assumption A4 is discussed throughout. It turns out that relaxing A4
only aﬀects the impact of a change in inequality on the process of development in the
19Note that without uncertainty, i.e., if a =ﬂ a ≡ a, the optimal schooling investment in an interior
solution (which requires hee < 0 under certainty) is given by Whe(ei
t,a)=R, according to (7). Thus,
under certainty, ei
t is independent of bi
t. For instance, this coincides with a result by Galor and Moav
(2004) when credit constraints are not binding in their model.
20There exist some estimates for the impact of parental income on children￿s earnings which al-
low for non-linearity. Whereas Becker and Tomes (1986) suggest that the marginal impact is di-
minishing, if anything, Behrman and Taubman (1990) ￿nd a positive marginal impact. To see
how these ￿ndings relate to the present model, ￿rst, de￿ne earnings of a member i of generation
t as function of her parent￿s income (suppressing ￿ a): E(Ii
t) ≡ ﬂ wh(e(b(Ii





t) have been used. Thus, E0(I)= ﬂ whe(e(b(I)),•)e0(b(I))b0(I) and
E00(I)= ﬂ w
£
heee0(b)2b0(I)2 + hee00(b)b0(I)2 + hee0(b)b00(I)
⁄
. Hence, for instance, E00(I) ≈ 0 if e00(b) ≈ 0
and the eﬀects arising from hee and b00(I) approximately cancel.
11subsequent period (￿short run￿) - but not beyond that - in a systematic way.21
4 The Role of Inequality for Income Dynamics
This section studies the aggregate behavior of the economy which results from indi-
vidual decisions analyzed in the preceding section. In particular, we examine how the
distribution of initial family wealth, for a given initial aggregate transfer B0 (and con-
ditional on initial GDP, Y0 = H0f(ﬂ k)), aﬀects the process of development. For this
purpose, it is useful to recall the dynamical system of the considered economy.
A given transfer bi
t to a member i of generation t is optimally allocated to savings
when young, si
t, and educational investments, ei
t = e(bi
t),i np e r i o dt (Proposition 1).





t),￿ a) ≡ ￿ h(b
i
t,￿ a) (8)
of eﬃciency units of human capital, supplied during adulthood (which is a random
variable). Thus, denoting the economy￿s c.d.f. of family wealth in period t by Ψt(b),






￿ h(b,￿ a)dΨt(b)dΦ(￿ a). (9)
Aggregate income is given by Yt+1 = Ht+1f(ﬂ k).23
21It is interesting to see assumption A4 in the light of a model in which there is no uncertainty
and a credit market is fully absent (e.g. Galor and Moav, 2004). In this case, one additional unit of
wealth is entirely devoted to education when human capital investment is below the level which would
be optimal if there were no educational borrowing constraint. That is, e0 =1for poor households
(whereas e0 =0when a household is not credit-constrained), i.e., (when e(b) is diﬀerentiable) e00 =0
holds exactly in such a framework.
22Note from the assumptions on initial conditions that B0 = {bP
0 ,b R
0 } and Ψ0(b)=0for 0 ≤ b<b P
0 ,
Ψ0(b)=1− λ for bP
0 ≤ b<b R
0 ,a n dΨ0(b)=1for b ≥ bR
0 .
23Note that the human capital risk considered in the model is consistent with risk associated with
skill speci￿city in the following sense. Suppose individuals acquire skills which are applicable in a
single ￿industry￿ only (which may also be interpreted as speci￿c task) and there are ideosyncratic
productivity shocks across industries (Wildasin, 2000). To see that this is consistent with the risk con-
sidered here, suppose there is a continuum [0,1] of intermediate goods industries, indexed by j. Output
12According to (3) and (8), given realization a of the random variable ￿ a after educa-





















t+1 is then optimally allocated to consumption, ci







t,a)) ≡ ￿ b(b
i
t,a). (11)
According to (11), the wealth transfer within each dynasty i follows a discrete time
Markov process de￿ned by the diﬀerence equation bi
t+1 = ￿ b(bi
t,￿ a).
Due to the small open economy assumption, there are no feedback eﬀects through
factor price changes from aggregate variables to individual behavior. This not only
simpli￿es the analysis but also excludes the mechanism suggested by the classical view:
i.e., that higher inequality fosters growth fueled by domestic accumulation of physical
capital if the MPS is increasing. It will turn out, however, that wealth accumulation
nevertheless plays a fundamental role for the inequality-growth relationship by aﬀecting
resources available for human capital accumulation at the individual level.
For simplicity, let us restrict attention to the case in which even for the worst
realizations of ￿ a, income of an adult increases without bound with the amount of
transfer received as child.24 Formally, this means the following.




where where θ(j) is the realization of an i.i.d. shock ￿ θ. (Note that because industries are symmetric
and b and ￿ θ are independently distributed, skill supply across industries is fully symmetric.) Sup-
pose this production technology simply reads qt(j)= ￿ Ht(j). Thus, the the aggregate stock of human





j∈[0,1] qt(j)dj can be thought of a composite input
of (perfectly substitutable) intermediate goods. Let ￿ θ and ￿ a ∈ A (still with c.d.f. Φ(￿ a)) be related
such that θ(j) ≡ Φ−1(j) is the realization of the shock in industry j ∈ [0,1] (i.e., after realization of











￿ h(b,￿ a)dΨt(b)dΦ(￿ a), which coincides with (9).
24Moreover, it is implicitly assumed throughout the paper that any young individual with zero
wealth is able to pay back the loan ﬂ Re(0), which equals such an individual￿s optimal amount of lending,
by her labor income even for the worst realization of the shock a, i.e., ￿ I(0,a)=ﬂ wh(e(0),a)− ﬂ Re(0) ≥ 0.
13A5. For all a ∈ A, ￿ Ib(b,a) > 0, b ∈ R+,a n dlimb→∞ ￿ I(b,a)=∞.25
The next two results characterize the Markov process bi
t+1 = ￿ b(bi
t,￿ a).
Lemma 3. Under A2 and A5, for all a ∈ A.T h e r e e x i s t s ba ≥ 0 such that
￿ b(b,a) > 0 and ￿ bb(b,a) > 0 for all b>b a.
Lemma 3 is easy to understand. Since the saving function b(I) is strictly increasing
above a threshold income level I (Lemma 1) and income as an adult is higher when
having received a higher transfer (from A5), the transfer left to the oﬀspring is positive
and (above a threshold level) strictly increasing in that received as child. Since inter-
generational transfers are increasing in income, which itself depends on the realization
of the random shock, a, this threshold level, ba, also depends on a.
For notational simplicity in what follows, suppress the random variable ￿ a by de￿ning










t) ≡ ￿ I(b
i
t,￿ a). (13)
We can then derive the following.26
Lemma 4. Under A1-A5, for any realization a ∈ A of the random shock ￿ a.( i )I f
b00(I) ≤ 0,t h e n￿ b00
1(b) ≤ 0. (ii) If, by contrast, b00(I) > 0 and hee =0 , then ￿ b00
1(b) > 0.
(iii) Otherwise, the sign of ￿ b00
1(b) is ambiguous.
According to part (i) of Lemma 4, if the saving function b(I) is concave (i.e.,
if b00(I) ≤ 0), then the transfer of an adult to her oﬀspring will be concave in the
25Using (10), it is easy to verify that e0(b) ≤ 1 is suﬃcient for ￿ Ib(b,a) > 0 to hold. That is, if a
marginal increase in b does not lead to a decline of investment in the ￿nancial market, then ￿ Ib > 0.
However, although plausible, e0(b) ≤ 1 is not ensured by the assumptions made so far. One can show,
for instance, that e0(b) < 1 if −
A0(￿ I(b,a)) ﬂ w
A(￿ I(b,a)) ≥
he￿ a(e(b),a)
h￿ a(e(b),a)he(e(b),a) for all a ∈ A.
26Note that in the case b(I)=0for I ≤ I and b(I) > 0 for I>I , I ≥ 0, the function b(I) is not
diﬀerentiable at I = I (and b0(I) > 0 for I>Iunder A2, according to Lemma 1). The subsequent
analysis neglects this for simplicity, implicitly stating results for I 6= I only.
14transfer she received as a child (i.e., ￿ b00
1(b) ≤ 0). However, if the MPS (for adults) is
increasing (i.e., if b00(I) > 0), the transfer of an adult to her oﬀspring may be convex
in the transfer received herself as a child (i.e., ￿ b00
1(b) > 0 is possible). Indeed, if the
return to education is non-diminishing, then ￿ b00
1(b) > 0 will typically (e.g., under A4)
hold under the empirically supported case of an increasing MPS (part (ii)). This is
because an individual which received a higher transfer b as child has higher (expected)
income as adult (recall ￿ Ib > 0), which positively aﬀects the MPS if b00 > 0. As will
become apparent, this is the crucial argument which gives rise to a potentially positive
relationship between inequality and growth. However, if hee < 0 (diminishing returns
to education), the marginal increase in income from a higher b received is typically
diminishing in b (i.e., ￿ Ibb < 0). This is a counteracting eﬀect to the one arising from
an increasing MPS, which explains part (iii) of Lemma 4.
The consequences of Lemma 4 for the process of development are analyzed in the
following.
4.1 Inequality and the Process of Development
Recall that, initially, there are two groups of individuals, rich and poor, and the ag-
gregate initial transfer is B0 = λbR
0 +(1−λ)bP
0 . To study the role of inequality for the










0 + ελ/(1 − λ), (14)
i.e., aggregate family wealth at t =0 , B0, is held constant. Under restriction ε <
(1 − λ)(bR
0 − bP
0 ), i.e., as long as ø bP
0 < ø bR
0 , the economy is said to be more equal, the
higher ε.27 This subsection derives comparative-static results with respect to changes
in ε in the transition path.28
27Note that income inequality and inequality of family wealth are closely related, according to
Lemma 1.
28Examining the transition path is consistent with the usual modelling approach in growth empirics
which relies on some hypothesis of conditional convergence (e.g., Barro, 1991, 2000). That is, regression
analysis regarding the determinants of economic growth, like inequality of income, usually control for
154.1.1 Short Run Impact of Higher Equality
Let gs,t ≡ (Ys − Yt)/Yt be the growth rate of aggregate output (or GDP, respectively)
between periods s and t, s>t≥ 0. First, consider the impact of an increase in ε on
the aggregate human capital stock H1,w h i c hg i v e su st h eshort run eﬀect of higher
equality on aggregate (or per capita) income, Y1 = H1f(ﬂ k), and thus, on the initial
growth rate g1,0 = H1/H0−1 of the economy (recall Y0 = H0f(ﬂ k)). Again, suppressing
the random variable for notational simplicity, let
￿ h1(b
i
t) ≡ ￿ h(b
i
t,￿ a) (15)
denote the (risky) human capital level of an individual which has received a transfer
bi






















0 + ελ/(1 − λ)
¢i
≡ ￿ H1(ε),
according to (9) and (14). From this, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. (Impact of higher equality in the short run). Suppose A1, A3
and A4 hold. Then a reduction in inequality of initial family wealth is associated with
higher aggregate income Y1 (and thus, faster growth g1,0) when the return to education
is diminishing, i.e., ￿ H0
1(ε) > 0 if hee < 0.I fhee =0 , then ￿ H0
1(ε) ≈ 0.
Proposition 2 is in line with a standard result in the literature on inequality and
growth when growth is driven by human capital investments (e.g., Galor and Zeira,
1993; BØnabou, 1996; Moav, 2002). Intuitively, if individual human capital investment
is an increasing function of wealth, which holds according to e0(•) > 0 (Proposition 1),
(initial) educational investment is spread over the population more equally when wealth
the level of per capita income in some base year (properly instrumented) to account for the stage of
development of an economy, like initial GDP, Y0. Usually, Y0 has signi￿cant eﬀects, suggesting that
observed economies are not yet close to stationary equilibria.
16is distributed more equally. Thus, under diminishing marginal returns to education
(i.e., hee < 0), the aggregate human capital stock typically increases in the short run
when wealth is redistributed lump sum. In contrast, if hee =0 , then inequality is
basically unrelated to short-run growth under A4.
If we would relax A4 and suppose hee =0 ,t h e n ￿ H0
1(ε) > (<)0 if e00 > (<)0.T h a t
is, if the marginal propensity to invest in education is decreasing in b,t h e n( l u m p - s u m )
redistribution to the poor would imply faster short-run growth. That is, e00 < 0 has
the same qualitative eﬀect as diminishing returns to education in the short run. In the
medium run, however, the role of e00 becomes unsystematic, as can be deduced from the
subsequent analysis (and is illustrated in Appendix B). The remainder of this section
thus focusses on the case in which A4 holds.
4.1.2 Medium Run Impact of Higher Equality
As shown next, the impact of a change in inequality in the medium run may be rather
diﬀerent to that in the short run, when b00 > 0 is allowed for.
Given family wealth bi
t in period t,h u m a nc a p i t a lo fam e m b e ri of generation t+1
in period t+2, for some realizations of random shocks regarding the own level of human
capital and that of her parent, respectively, is
h
i




t)) ≡ ￿ h2(b
i
t), (17)
according to (15) and (12), respectively. The following auxiliary result is established.
Lemma 5. For any realizations of random shocks.
(a) Under A1-A3 and A5, ￿ h0
2(b) > 0 if b0(I) > 0.
(b) Under A1-A5: (i) If b00(I) ≤ 0,t h e n￿ h00
2(b) ≤ 0; (ii) If, by contrast, b00(I) > 0
and hee =0 , then ￿ h00
2(b) > 0.(iii) Otherwise, the sign of ￿ h00
2(b) is ambiguous.
Regarding Lemma 5 (a), if the MPS is positive, then a higher transfer, b, received
as child raises the own child￿s level of human capital, for given realizations of random
17shocks. Lemma 5 (b) concerns the question how this marginal eﬀect of b in Lemma
5 (a) changes with b. As is intuitive from Lemma 4, if the transfer ￿ b1(b) left as adult
is strictly convex in the own transfer b received and educational investments are not
subject to diminishing returns, the marginal impact of an increase in b on the human
capital level of the own child is typically increasing in b (part (ii) of Lemma 5 (b)),
for given realizations of random shocks. This can never happen if the saving function,
b(I), is concave (part (i)). If hee < 0,t h e na ni n c r e a s ei ne d u c a t i o no fa ni n d i v i d u a la n d
her child which is triggered by an increase in b received by this individual is subject to
diminishing returns. This counteracts the eﬀe c tw h i c ha r i s e si ft h eM P Si si n c r e a s i n g
in income, which explains part (iii) of Lemma 5.


















0 + ελ/(1 − λ)
¢ii
≡ ￿ H2(ε). (18)
This leads to the following result.
Lemma 6. Under A1-A5. (i) If b00(I) ≤ 0,t h e n ￿ H0
2(ε) ≥ 0. (ii) If, by con-
trast, b00(I) > 0 and hee =0 ,t h e n ￿ H0
2(ε) < 0. (iii) Otherwise, the sign of ￿ H0
2(ε) is
ambiguous.
In view of Lemma 5, the intuition of Lemma 6 is straightforward. In contrast to the
short-run impact of a change in inequality, the impact of an increase in ε on the aggre-
gate human capital stock in period 2, H2, also depends on the intergenerational wealth
transmission as function of parents￿ income. When ε increases in the initial period,
members of generation 0 which belong to a poor dynasty (endowed with ø bP
0 )i n v e s t
more in education and thus (when b0(•) > 0) transmit more wealth to their children
(in period 1), on average, whereas those from rich dynasties transmit less. If b00 > 0
and hee =0 , then the average reduction in wealth transmission of the rich outweighs
the average increase in wealth transmission of the poor. The resulting eﬀect on the
18aggregate level of human capital of members of generation 1 (in period 2) is typically
negative (part (ii) of Lemma 6). By contrast, if hee < 0, then the short run eﬀect of
higher equality on the aggregate human capital stock which underlies Proposition 2
also applies two periods after a lump-sum redistribution, and may dominate the eﬀect
arising from an increasing MPS. Thus, if b00 > 0 and hee < 0, the overall impact of a
change in inequality on the aggregate human capital level two periods after this change
is ambiguous. (part (iii) of Lemma 6). Roughly spoken, the ￿more convex￿ b(I) and
the ￿less concave￿ h(e,•) in e is, the ￿more likely￿ is ￿ H0
2(ε) < 0,w h i c hr e ￿ects a positive
relationship between inequality and growth. As argued in section 5, for the U.S., for
i n s t a n c e ,t h ee v i d e n c ef o rb00 > 0 is strong but that for hee < 0 is not, which suggests
that part (ii) of Lemma 6 refers to the relevant case.
To draw conclusions for the role of (initial) inequality for the process of development
in the medium run, i.e., to examine the impact of an increase in ε on the growth rate
gt,0(= Yt/Y0 − 1=Ht/H0 − 1) for t ≥ 2,l e t
h
i




t)) ≡ ￿ h3(b
i
t). (19)



















0 + ελ/(1 − λ)
¢iii
≡ ￿ H3(ε). (20)
As can be seen from comparing (20) with (18), the structure of the development process
through wealth transmission and human capital investments remains similar from pe-
riod 2 onwards. In fact, in line with Lemma 6, the following can be concluded.
Proposition 3. (Impact of higher equality in the medium run). Under A1-A5,
for all ￿nite t ≥ 2.( i )I fb00(I) ≤ 0, a reduction in inequality of initial family wealth
has a non-negative impact on the subsequent growth rate gt,0. (ii) If, by contrast,
b00(I) > 0 and hee =0 , then the relationship between inequality and gt,0 is positive.
(iii) Otherwise, the relationship between inequality and gt,0 is ambiguous.
19Proposition 3 establishes that the medium run impact of higher inequality on human
capital accumulation and growth critically depends on the properties of the saving
function, b(I), and whether the return to educational investment is diminishing. The
existing literature has focussed on speci￿cations such that b00(I) ≤ 0 and hee < 0
(apart from a diﬀerent microfoundation of the relationship between intergenerational
transfers and human capital investment, e(b), which usually relies on credit constraints
rather than on labor income risk as pursued here). The analysis has made clear that
these hypotheses are not innocuous by identifying the critical forces which drive the
inequality-growth relationship, further discussed in section 5 in light of the empirical
evidence.
Appendix B illustrates part (ii) of Proposition 3 by specifying u(c,b)=αc−βc2 +
lnb, which gives an example such that b00 > 0, and, in addition, assumptions A3 and
A4 typically hold.
4.2 Inequality and Aggregate Income in Stationary Equilib-
rium
What is the impact of a change in initial inequality on the aggregate human capital
stock and per capita income in the long run (i.e., as t →∞ ), denoted by H∞ and
Y∞ = H∞f(ﬂ k), respectively? Answering this question requires an analysis of the long
run behavior of wealth transfers within dynasties, which are governed by the Markov
process bi
t+1 = ￿ b(bi
t,￿ a),d e ￿ned by (11). Due to the uncertainty in the model, these
transfers never reach steady state points as known from deterministic models. There-
fore, the goal is to ￿nd stationary equilibria in the sense that, as t →∞ ,t h edistribu-
tion of bi
t within dynasty i is time-invariant. The following discussion of such stationary
equilibria, and its consequences for the relationship between inequality and per capita
income in the long run deals, in a rather informal way, with simple cases which cap-
ture the relevant mechanisms. A more formal and general treatment is provided in a
supplement to this paper (available on request).
20To focus the discussion on an empirically relevant case, suppose intergenerational
transfers are zero for low levels of income.29 Moreover, to prevent in￿nite wealth
accumulation of rich dynasties, suppose that for high wealth levels bi and for a = a,ﬂ a,
￿ b(bi,a) is strictly concave as function of bi.30 Simple cases which meet these two criteria
are depicted in Fig. 1.31
<Figure 1>
Panel (a) shows a situation in which, irrespective of initial wealth holdings, for any
dynasty i, bi
t =0as t →∞with probability one. This is called a trivial stationary
equilibrium. (In panel (a), this equilibrium is also globally stable.) Obviously, in this
case, a change in the inequality of initial wealth has no impact on per capita income
in the long run, Y∞.
In panel (b), if bi
0 ≤ cﬂ a, again, wealth levels within dynasty i become zero with
probability one in the long run (which now is a locally stable stationary equilibrium).
If bi
0 ≥ ca, then the distribution of bi
t converges with probability one to a locally unique
stable stationary equilibrium on the interval [da,d ﬂ a].T h u s ,i fbi
0 ≤ cﬂ a for i = R,P or
if bi
0 ≥ ca for all i, a reduction in initial inequality does not aﬀect Y∞.I f , h o w e v e r ,
bi
0 ∈ (cﬂ a,c a), then, as t →∞ ,b o t hbi
t =0or bi
t ∈ [da,d ﬂ a] is possible with positive
probability.32 Thus, according to the law of large numbers, if bP
0 ∈ (cﬂ a,c a),s o m e
fraction q ∈ (0,1) of initially poor dynasties will end up with zero wealth in the long
run. Also by the law of large numbers, note that this fraction q is increasing in the
distance of bP
0 to ca (or decreasing in
¡
bP
0 − cﬂ a
¢





29For the U.S., for instance, it has been frequently con￿rmed that the mean savings rate of house-
holds in the lowest quintile of the income distribution is non-positive (e.g., Browning and Lusardi,
1996; Dynan et al., 2004).
30It is easy to verify that, even if b00(I) > 0, this occurs under weak conditions if the return to
education is eventually diminishing, i.e., hee < 0 for high levels of e, triggered by high intergenerational
transfers.
31Note that for bi
t+1 > 0,t h e￿ b−curves for a and ﬂ a do not intersect because ￿ ba(b,a) > 0 in this
case. Also note that, under A2 and A5, ￿ b(bi,a) is strictly increasing in bi for a = a,ﬂ a if bi >b a,b ﬂ a,
a c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a3 .
32For illuminating discussions of this stationary equilibrium indeterminacy in stochastic models,
see, e.g., Laitner (1981) and Wang (1993).
21is, the larger the fraction 1 − q of initially poor dynasties which transmit positive
wealth levels in the long run. Hence, if bR
0 >c a and bP
0 ∈ (cﬂ a,c a),t h e na n yl u m p -
sum redistribution to the poor which leaves wealth levels of initially rich individuals
suﬃciently high,33 unambiguously leads to higher average human capital investments,
H∞,i fe0(b) > 0 (as ensured under A1 and A3, according to Proposition 1), and thus,
t oah i g h e rY∞. This case may be relevant in advanced countries, i.e., if there is a large
group of suﬃciently rich individuals. Whereas in this situation there is a negative link
between inequality and Y∞, there may be a positive link in other situations. To see
this, suppose bi
0 ∈ (0,c ﬂ a] for i = R,P, such that the distribution of wealth levels of all
dynasties converge with probability one to the trivial stationary equilibrium.34 In this
case, suﬃcient redistribution to the rich may result in a situation in which wealth levels
of at least some initially rich dynasties converge to the stationary equilibrium on the
interval [da,d ﬂ a], without aﬀecting the long run wealth distribution of the initially poor
( w h oe n du pw i t hz e r ow e a l t ha n y w a y ) .T h u s ,Y∞ is raised. Finally, if bi
0 ∈ (cﬂ a,c a) for
i = R,P, the impact of a change in inequality on Y∞ is ambiguous. In sum, we may
conclude the following from this discussion.
Proposition 4. (Impact of higher equality in the long run). Suppose a stationary
equilibrium of the Markov process bi
t+1 = ￿ b(bi
t,￿ a) exists. Then the relationship between
equality and long run income, Y∞, is generally ambiguous, irrespective of the shape of
t h es a v i n gf u n c t i o n ,b(I).
Thus, even if there is a systematic relationship between initial inequality and ag-
gregate income in the short run and medium run (see Propositions 2 and 3 in section
4.1), one cannot draw general conclusions regarding the relationship between initial
inequality and Y∞ from the shape of the saving function. It might be concluded, how-
33More precisely, this refers to any increase in ε small enough such that ø bR
0 = bR
0 −ε ≥ ca, implying
that the distribution of wealth holdings of initially rich dynasties still converges with probability one
to a locally unique stationary equilibrium on the interval [da,d ﬂ a].
34This re￿ects a poverty trap of the kind often encountered in the literature on inequality and
growth (e.g., Perotti, 1993; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Moav, 2002), which here is derived from a
stochastic model.
22ever, that the relationship between initial inequality and long run income, if anything,
is negative for advanced countries, whereas higher inequality may help to overcome a
poverty trap in poor economies.
5 Empirical Evidence on the Critical Hypotheses
This section reviews empirical evidence regarding the three critical determinants of the
inequality-growth relationship identi￿ed in this paper: how the marginal propensitiy
to save and bequeath, respectively, changes with income (section 5.1), the impact of
higher family wealth (or income) on children￿s human capital investment (section 5.2),
and whether the marginal return to education is diminishing (section 5.3).
5.1 Saving Behavior and Intergenerational Transfers
In the model, the amount of intergenerational transfers equals the amount of savings of
adult individuals. In fact, empirically, savings seem to be strongly related to inter vivos
gifts and bequests, thus lending support for a crucial assumption about preferences in
the model. For instance, Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981) emphasize the importance of
intergenerational transfers for capital accumulation in the U.S., a hypothesis which
has been frequently con￿rmed by later evidence. In particular, as argued by Menchik
and David (1983) and Dynan et al. (2002, 2004), observed saving behavior in the
U.S. is empirically consistent with models hypothesizing a ￿joy of giving￿ motive for
intergenerational transfers.35 De Nardi (2003) calibrates an overlapping-generations
model with voluntary and accidental bequests, arguing that voluntary bequests play a
35In contrast, the standard altruism (dynastic) model Æ la Barro (1974) seems to be inconsistent
with the data. For instance, unlike predicted by the dynastic model, inheritances do not seem to
compensate for earnings diﬀerences among siblings (e.g. Wilhelm, 1996). Moreover, as discussed
in Carroll (2000), there does not seem to be an indication that the size of bequest is an increasing
function of the ratio of parent￿s to child￿s lifetime income. Finally, whereas a one-dollar reduction in
income of a recipient should raise inter vivos transfers from parents to child by one dollar according
to the dynastic model, evidence by Altonji et al. (1997) suggests that transfers increase by just 13
cent on average, conditional on the event of a positive transfer having occurred.
23crucial role for explaining observed wealth concentration patterns not only in the U.S.
but also in Sweden.
According to the preceding analysis, if the MPS for adults, b0(•),i si n c r e a s i n gi n
income, then inequality may be positively related to growth in the medium run even if
marginal returns to human capital investments are diminishing (Proposition 3). This
is because under individual uncertainty of returns to human capital investments, (ini-
tial) wealth inequality aﬀects human capital accumulation through intergenerational
transfers.
Evidence on U.S. saving and bequest behavior suggests that saving rates are strongly
increasing in lifetime income.36 For instance, Dynan et al. (2004) provide estimates
from median regressions which imply that a $10,000 increase in (permanent) income is
associated with an increase in the median saving rate in a range from 2 to 7 percent,
depending on the database and instruments used.37 This strong correlation between
saving rates and permanent income can neither be led back to the saving behavior of
high-income entrepreneurs nor is there evidence that the relationship changes for older
households. Most importantly for the results of the theoretical model developed in the
present paper, their estimates strongly suggest that the MPS is increasing in income.
For instance, the MPS rises from 0.08-0.09 in the lowest quintile to around 0.18-0.23
in quintile 4, depending on the saving measure used. In a less recent study, Menchik
and David (1983) directly focus on bequest behavior. Their evidence suggests that the
marginal propensity to bequeath is increasing in lifetime earnings. In sum, at least for
the U.S., the evidence clearly supports the case b00(•) > 0.
36There is overwhelming evidence for the hypothesis that saving rates rise strongly with current
income (e.g., Browning and Lusardi, 1996). However, as pointed out by Friedman (1957), this ￿nding
may just re￿ect a response of savings behavior to changes in transitory income. That is, if income is
temporarily high, savings increase and, analogously, if income is temporarily low, savings are reduced.
Over the life-cycle, however, a positive relationship between current income and saving rates may still
be consistent with a constant saving rate as function of lifetime (or permanent) income.
37Dynan et al. (2004) use three diﬀerent databases to account for diﬀerent measures of savings and
use diﬀerent instruments for permanent income like consumption, lagged and/or future earnings, and
education.
245.2 Educational Investment and Parental Income
Another crucial element in the model is the positive relationship between family wealth
and educational investments, e0(•) > 0 (Proposition 1). This result has been derived
from the hypothesis that the variance of earnings increases with educational invest-
ments, consistent with evidence by Pereira and Martins (2002, 2004) for advanced
European countries (in a period between 1980 and 1995) who con￿rm somewhat less
recent evidence discussed in Levhari and Weiss (1974).
In fact, there is overwhelming evidence for Proposition 1. First, although credit
constraints to ￿nance higher education seem to be negligible in advanced countries (e.g.,
Cameron and Taber, 2004), there is a strong positive relationship between parental
social background and children￿s investment (or participation) in higher education.
For instance, Manski (1992) ￿nds that the percentage of children from low-income
families in the U.S. who graduate from high school is substantially lower than among
high school graduates from other families. Similar patterns can be found in Germany.
Egeln et al. (2003) report that in 1996 even among those children who were eligible
for university education (not more than roughly a third of all high school graduates in
Germany), only 24 percent with a less favorable social background went to university,
in contrast to 86 percent with a favorable social background.38 This comparison is
striking, as it is rather implausible that heterogeneity in intellectual ability (which
may partly be shaped by the social background) can account for this diﬀerence among
those who have already acquired eligibility (￿Hochschulreife￿).
In his review of U.S. evidence based on econometric studies, Taubman (1989) con-
cludes that estimates for the elasticity of years of schooling with respect to parental
income are generally positive and range from 3 to 80 percent, after controlling for
parents￿ education, father￿s occupation, and/or children￿s test scores on mental ability
tests. Accounting for similar controls, also the correlation between children￿s adult
38In Germany, eligibility to attend university is exclusivley determined by high school performance.
Egeln et al. (2003) also ￿nd that among all high school graduates only 8 percent with a less favorable
social background went to university, in contrast to 72 percent of high school graduates with a favorable
social background.
25earnings and their parents￿ income is highly positive (e.g. Behrman and Taubman,
1990). As concluded in a recent survey article by Solon (1999, p. 1789): ￿Most of
the evidence [...] indicates that intergenerational earnings elasticities are substantial
and are larger than we used to think.￿ An important question which arises from this
evidence is to which degree these ￿ndings are due to genetic factors. For instance,
Sacerdote (2002) ￿nds that the eﬀect of socioeconomic status on children￿s college
attendance is just as large for adoptees as for children raised by biological parents,
suggesting no signi￿cance of genetic factors. Plug and Vijverberg (2003) report higher
eﬀects of genetic factors (measured by parents￿ IQ) on the children￿s years of schooling
and college attainment, although family income still has a large eﬀect, consistent with
Proposition 1.
5.3 Diminishing Returns to Education?
The question whether or not the marginal return to human capital investments is
diminishing at the individual level is perhaps most debatable. For relevant ranges,
standard Mincer estimates do not seem to support the diminishing-returns hypothe-
sis. For instance, empirical evidence for the returns to schooling suggests that (mean)
log-earnings log-hourly wages are approximately linear in the (mean) years of educa-
tion (e.g., Card, 1999), thus implying a strictly convex mapping between the years
of schooling and earnings. (Recall that in the present model, individual earnings are
given by ﬂ wh.) This does not necessarily suggest hee > 0, since the cost of an additional
year of schooling may increase with the years of schooling (e.g., think of college versus
high-school education). However, it certainly does not suggest hee < 0 either.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has proposed a theory which suggests that the impact of higher (wealth)
inequality on growth fueled by risky human capital investments during the transition to
the steady state may be positive under empirically supported conditions. In contrast to
26the classical view which argues that higher inequality enhances growth through physical
capital accumulation, this alternative theory does not require any connection between
national savings and physical capital investment in an economy. Instead, it rests on
the role of intergenerational wealth transmission for individual incentives to invest in
risky and uninsurable human capital.
The hypotheses which drive the results are well testable empirically. First, it has
been shown that, under the fairly weak and empirically supported requirements of
decreasing absolute risk aversion and labor income risk, individual human capital in-
vestment is increasing in parental income. This prediction is consistent with empirical
evidence even in advanced countries, where credit-market imperfections seem to play
a minor (or no) role. Starting from this hypothesis of a positive relationship be-
tween parental income and human capital investments, the analysis has demonstrated
that saving behavior critically determines how the personal income distribution af-
fects human-capital based growth in an economy￿s process of development through the
eﬀects of intergenerational wealth transmission. The analysis suggests that, under non-
diminishing marginal returns to education, the impact of higher inequality on medium
run growth is typically positive if the MPS is increasing in income. In contrast, if the
MPS is non-increasing, then the opposite holds, which in line with the existing litera-
ture on inequality, human capital, and macroeconomics (provided there is no poverty
trap). However, at least for the U.S., empirical evidence supports the hypothesis on a
strictly convex saving function.39
Contrary to the transition path, how inequality aﬀects per capita income in the
long run (i.e., in stationary equilibrium) does not critically depend of the properties
of the saving function. One can conclude that, on the one hand, higher inequality
39Regarding an empirical test of the inequality-growth relationship suggested by the proposed the-
ory, ￿rst, one has to be cautious to interpret the terms short run and medium run, which have an
obviously diﬀerent meaning in an OLG model than conventionally used in empirical studies (which
may refer to the medium run as 10 years or so, whereas here it refers to at least two generations). Thus,
a strict test requires long panels, which yet may not be available. Second, a rigorous cross-country
study of the proposed theory requires good data about the critical determinants for the inequality-
growth relationship identi￿ed here (discussed primarily for the U.S. in section 5) in suﬃciently many
countries.
27may contribute to overcome poverty traps. On the other hand, the analysis suggests
that inequality may discourage long run human capital investment for initially poorer
dynasties, without aﬀecting the rich, which is an adverse long run eﬀect of inequality.
It is important to note, however, that even if the relationship between inequality
and human-capital based growth turns out to be positive, the proposed theory does not
suggest a rationale for inegalitarian policies. For instance, under uninsurable human
capital risk, distortionary redistribution through the tax system may enhance risk-
taking by providing insurance, as suggested by the literature on portfolio choice and
taxation.40 To examine the role of the shape of the saving function for implications of




P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :Note that, according to (5), bi


















t+1) ≤ 0, (A.1)
which holds with equality if bi
t+1 > 0. According to (A.1), Ωb = ucc − 2ucb + ubb
and ΩI = −ucc + ucb, i.e., assumption A2 implies ΩI > 0 and Ωb < 0.41 First, suppose
bi
t+1 =0 .S i n c eΩI > 0, the left-hand side of the inequality in (A.1) is strictly increasing
in Ii




ub(I,0) from A2, eventually, bi
t+1 > 0 if income
Ii
t+1 exceeds some level I ≥ 0.S e c o n d , f o r bi
t+1 > 0, applying the implicit function
40Moreover, since the model does not contain any ￿trickle-down￿ mechanism, a standard equity-
growth trade-oﬀ arises such that optimal policy will crucially hinge on the social welfare function
chosen.
41To con￿rm Ωb < 0,u s eucc < 0 and uccubb−(ucb)2 > 0 from A2 to obtain ubb < (ucb)2/ucc.T h u s ,
Ωb = ucc −2ucb +ubb <u cc −2ucb +(ucb)2/ucc =( ucc −ucb)2/ucc < 0. Of course, this is nothing else








ucc − 2ucb + ubb
> 0 (A.2)
under A2. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: First, if bi
t+1 = b(Ii
t+1)=0 ,w eh a v ev(Ii
t+1)=u(Ii
t+1,0);
thus, v0(I)=uc(I,0) > 0 and v00(I)=ucc(I,0) < 0.I f b(I) > 0,t h e nv0(I)=
uc(I−b(I),b(I)) > 0, according to (6), (A.1) and the envelope theorem. Thus, v00(I)=
ucc + b0(I)(ucb − ucc). Substituting (A.2) into the latter expression, we obtain v00(I)=
ucc −(ucb−ucc)2/(ucc−2ucb +ubb). Manipulating the latter expression implies v00(I)=
[uccubb − (ucb)2]/Ωb (recall Ωb = ucc − 2ucb + ubb < 0). Hence, v00(I) < 0, according to
the strict concavity of u(c,b) presumed (assumption A2). This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: First, note that, in an interior solution, ei
t = e(bi
t) is




































t,￿ a) − ﬂ R
¢⁄
=0 ,
according to (3) and (7). (An interior solution is ensured by assumption A1.) Due
to v00(I) < 0 (recall Lemma 2) and hee ≤ 0,w eh a v eΞe < 0.T h u s ,a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
implicit function theorem, e0(bi




t) > 0. For notational
simplicity, indices t and i are suppressed in the remainder of this proof. Moreover,





















·¡ ﬂ R − ﬂ whe(e(b),￿ a)
¢i
ﬂ R,
where A(I)=−v00(I)/v0(I) has been used for the latter equation. De￿ne a0 as the






































·¡ ﬂ R − ﬂ whe(•,￿ a)
¢
dΦ(￿ a).
Recall from assumption A1 that hea > 0.T h u s , b y t h e d e ￿nition of a0,t h e￿rst
integral in (A.5) is positive, whereas the second one is negative. Moreover, note that

























































·¡ ﬂ R − ﬂ whe(•,￿ a)
¢
dΦ(￿ a).

























Under the optimal human capital investment, e(b), the left-hand side of (A.8) is zero,




ﬂ whe(e(b),￿ a) − ﬂ R
¢i
> 0, implying Ξb(b,e)|e=e(b) >
0, according to (A.4). Hence, e0(b) > 0. This concludes the proof. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :Recall from Lemma 1 (which is implied by A2) that there
exists I ≥ 0 such that b(I) > 0 and b0(I) > 0 if I>I . Also recall from (11) that
30￿ b(b,a)=b(￿ I(b,a)), which implies ￿ bb(b,a)=b0(￿ I(b,a))￿ Ib(b,a). Thus, under A5, for all
a ∈ A, a gradual increase in b eventually must lead to a level of b, denoted by ba,s u c h
that ￿ b(b,a) > 0 and ￿ bb(b,a) > 0 for all b>b a. This concludes the proof. ¥
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a ∈ A. Under A4, we can neglect the second summand on the right-hand side of
(A.12). Thus, under A1, A3 and A4, we have ￿ I00
1(b) < (=)0,i fhee < (=)0,s i n c e
e0(b) > 0 (Proposition 1). Hence, under A2 (which implies b0(I) ≥ 0, according to
Lemma 1), we have ￿ b00
1(b) ≤ 0 if b00(I) ≤ 0, according to (A.10). This con￿rms part
(i). To con￿rm part (ii), note that, if b00(I) > 0, the sign of the ￿rst summand on the
right-hand side of (A.10) is strictly positive for all a ∈ A under A5. Observing that,
under A4, ￿ I00
1(b)=0if hee =0proves part (ii). However, since ￿ I00
1(b) < 0 if hee < 0
under A4, the sign of ￿ b00
1(b) is generally ambiguous if b00(I) > 0 and hee < 0, according
to (A.10). This con￿rms part (iii). ¥





















a ∈ A,a c c o r d i n gt o( 8 )a n d( 1 5 ) .S i n c eø bP
0 < ø bR
0 , (A.13) implies that ￿ H0
1(ε) > 0 if, for
instance, for all a ∈ A and for all b ∈ R++, ￿ h00







according to (A.14). The ￿rst summand on the right-hand side of (A.15) is negative
(zero) if hee < (=)0,s i n c ee0(b) > 0, according to Proposition 1 (which holds under A1
and A3). Thus, if e00(b) ≤ 0,o ri fe00(b) is positive but small in magnitude as supposed
in A4, we have ￿ h00
1(b) < 0 if hee < 0. In constrast, if hee =0and e00 =0 ,t h e n￿ h00
1 =0 .
This con￿rms the result. ¥



















Under A2, (whenever diﬀerentiable) b0(•) ≥ 0, according to Lemma 1, and, under A1
and A3, e0(•) > 0, according to Proposition 1. Moreover, ￿ I0
1(b) > 0 under A5. Thus,
recalling he > 0, Lemma 5 (a) follows from (A.17).





















32The ￿rst summand on the right-hand side of (A.18) is non-positive since hee ≤ 0.
Moreover, if |e00(b)| is small in magnitude as supposed in A4, the ￿rst term in square
brackets of (A.18) is negligible. Regarding the second term in square brackets, if
b00(I) ≤ 0,t h e n￿ b00
1(•) ≤ 0 according to part (i) of Lemma 4. In addition, recall e0(•) > 0
from Proposition 1 (which holds under A1 and A3). Thus, if b00(I) ≤ 0, then the
second term in square brackets of (A.18) is non-positive. Hence, ￿ h00
2(b) ≤ 0 if b00(I) ≤ 0,
con￿r m i n gp a r t( i )o fL e m m a5( b ) .H o w e v e r ,i fb00(I) > 0 and hee =0 ,t h e n￿ b00
1(b) > 0,
according to part (ii) of Lemma 4. Consequently, ￿ h00
2(b) > 0 if b00(I) > 0, hee =0and
A4 hold, according to (A.18). This con￿rms part (ii) of Lemma 5 (b). Part (iii) follows
from the fact that the sign of ￿ b00
1(b) is ambiguous if b00(I) > 0 and hee < 0 (part (iii) of
Lemma 4). This concludes the proof. ¥



















0 < ø bR
0 , (A.19) implies that ￿ H0
2(ε) > (=,<)0 if, for instance, for all realizations
a0,a 1 ∈ A at t =0 ,1 and for all b ∈ R+, ￿ h00
2(b) < (=,>)0. Finally, use Lemma 5 (b).
This con￿rms Lemma 6. ¥



























a c c o r d i n gt ot h ed e ￿nition ￿ h3(b)=￿ h2(￿ b1(b)) in (19). Since ø bP
0 < ø bR
0 , (A.20) implies
that ￿ H0
3(ε) > (=,<)0 if, for instance, for all realizations a0,a 1,a 2 ∈ A at t =0 ,1,2,
and for all b ∈ R+, ￿ h00













33Recall that ￿ h0
2(•) ≥ 0, according to Lemma 5 (a). First, suppose b00(I) ≤ 0.T h u s ,
￿ h00
3(b) ≤ 0,s i n c e￿ b00
1(•) ≤ 0 and ￿ h00
2(b) ≤ 0 in this case, according to part (i) of Lemma
4 and part (i) of Lemma 5 (b), respectively. Using (A.22), this con￿rms part (i) of
Proposition 3. In an analogous fashion, parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 follow from
(A.22) together with parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 4 and parts (ii) and (iii) of Lemma
5 (b), respectively. Thus, the impact of an increase in ε on H3 is similar to its impact
on H2, where the latter has been established in Lemma 6. The impact of an increase
in ε on H4 and higher can be established in a completely analogous fashion, employing
a very similar structure, which yields similar results. This concludes the proof. ¥
B. An Example (With an Increasing MPS)
This appendix provides a simple illustration of the analysis (particularly, part (ii) of
Proposition 3) by specifying preferences in a way that the MPS is strictly increasing
with income. As claimed in the main text and as will become apparent soon, b00 > 0
if u(c,b)=αc − βc2 +l nb,a sl o n ga suc > 0. (It is easy to see that assumption A2
and thus also Lemma 1 and 2 hold under this speci￿cation.) Also note, by recalling
c = I −b,t h a tuc > 0 if and only if b>I−α/(2β), which is the exclusive focus in the
following discussion. First-order condition (A.1) for optimal savings as adult implies
that bi




















t+1) > 0 for all Ii

















(B.2) con￿rms that b00 > 0 holds whenever uc > 0.S i n c eb(I) > 0 is given by uc = ub,
a c c o r d i n gt o( A . 1 ) ,w eh a v ev0 = uc = ub, according to (6), and thus v0(I)=1 /b(I) in
34the considered utility speci￿cation. Thus, v00(I)=−b0(I)/b(I)2. From this and (B.2),







·3 > 0, (B.3)
which is a necessary condition for assumption A3, A0(I) < 0,t oh o l d . 42 T h ed e g r e eo f












according to (B.2). That is, assumption A3 holds (i.e., A(I) is strictly decreasing in I)
if 2b0(I)−1 > 0, which is equivalent to I>α/(2β),a c c o r d i n gt o( B . 2 ) .I ns u m ,uc > 0





Hence, under assumption A1, e0(b) > 0 if (B.5) holds, according to Proposition 1.
In the remainder of this appendix, we focus on a range of e in which hee(e,a)=0
for all a ∈ A. We now examine whether assumption A4 and ￿ b00
1(b) > 0 hold, which
give rise a positive medium run eﬀect of inequality on per capita income (part (iii) of

























ﬂ whe(e(b),￿ a) − ﬂ R
¢2i . (B.6)


















Recall from (B.3) that v000 > 0 in the considered speci￿cation. Since, in addition,
42Note that A0(I) < 0 if and only if −v000(I)/v00(I) >A (I), i.e., −v0(I) is ￿more concave￿ that v(I).
35ﬂ whe(e(b),a) < ﬂ R for small a and ﬂ whe(e(b),a) > ﬂ R for high a, according to ￿rst-order
condition (A.3) and assumption hea > 0,t h es i g no fe00(b) is generally ambiguous (and
can be zero), lending some justi￿cation to |e00(b)| ≈ 0 (assumption A4). This implies
￿ H0
1(ε) ≈ 0 (if hee =0 ), i.e., the impact of a change in inequality on short-run growth
is negligible (compare with Proposition 2). Substituting (A.11), (A.12) and (B.2) into















2β − ￿ I1(b)
. (B.8)
According to (B.5), the second summand in the numerator is strictly positive. The
￿rst summand may have either sign, and is negligble under A4. If, for instance, e00 <
(>)0, then it is positive (negative) for small realizations of ￿ a, and vice versa for large
realizations of ￿ a. This demonstrates that for the medium run impact of a change
in inequality (see Proposition 3), the sign of e00 plays a rather unsystematic role (in
contrast to the short run eﬀect). Relaxing A4 beyond the short run analysis thus does
not yield further economic insights.
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41Supplement to: Risky Human Capital Investment,




This supplement provides a more formal treatment of stationary equilibria
a n dg e n e r a l i z e st h ec a s e sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n4 . 2( b a s e do nF i g .1 ) .M o r e o v e r ,a
simple example which is based on a standard speci￿cation of preferences in the
literature is provided. Finally, it is shown that, if ha > 0 and hea > (<)0,t h e n
the variance of earnings is strictly increasing (strictly decreasing) in educational
investment e.
1 Stationary Equilibria (ad Section 4.2)
Let P(b,•) be the transition function of the Markov process bi
t+1 = ￿ b(bi
t,￿ a), i.e., P(bi,Z)
is the probability that bi is in the set Z one period after it started in bi.T h a ti s ,
P(b
i,Z) ≡ Pr{￿ a : ￿ b(b




where Zbi ≡ {￿ a : ￿ b(bi,￿ a) ∈ Z} and Z is a Borel set in R+.M o r e o v e r , l e t ￿i
t(Z) ≡
Pr{bi
t ∈ Z} for all Z ⊂ R+, t =0 ,1,2,...,b et h eprobability measure associated with
bi
t. Thus, given initial wealth bi
0 of dynasty i, ￿i
0 is given by ￿i
0([0,b i)) = 0 for all
bi ≤ bi
0 and ￿i
0([bi,∞)) = 1 otherwise. Starting from ￿i
0, the distribution of family




t(dbi) for all Z ⊂ R+.F r o m t h i s ,
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1we can de￿ne a stationary equilibrium as follows. (De￿nitions 1 and 2 closely follow
Wang, 1993).
De￿nition 1. (Stationary equilibrium). A stationary equilibrium for family wealth
bi of dynasty i is a probability measure ￿i such that ￿i(Z)=
R
P(bi,Z)￿i(dbi) for
all Z ⊂ R+.A trivial stationary equilibrium is a stationary equilibrium which is
associated with a distribution of bi such that all mass is concentrated on zero (i.e.,
limt→∞ Pr{bi
t =0 } = 1).
Together with De￿nition 1, the next de￿nition leads to an important existence
result.
De￿nition 2. (Stable set). An interval [x,y] ⊂ R is called a stable set of the
stochastic process ￿ b if (i) ￿ b(bi,x)=x, ￿ b(bi,y)=y,a n d( i i )￿ b(bi,x) <b i, ￿ b(bi,y) >b i for
all x<b i <y .
Lemma C.1. (Wang, 1993). There is a unique stable stationary equilibrium on a
stable set I. Moreover, the convergence to the stationary equilibrium is uniform on I.
Proof. Brock and Mirman (1972), Wang (1993).
Given these preliminaries, let Sa ≡ {b ∈ R++
ﬂ
ﬂ ﬂ￿ b(b,a)=0} be the set of strictly
positive transfers received by a young individual, such that the optimal transfer as
adult to her oﬀspring is zero, a ∈ A.M o r e o v e r ,l e tba ≡ maxSa be the largest element
of such a set. Suppose that the following holds.
A6. Sﬂ a is non-empty, i.e., there exists bﬂ a > 0.




￿ Ia, according to (10) and (11). Thus, using ￿ Ia > 0
and Lemma 1, we have ba >b ﬂ a for all a ∈ [a,ﬂ a). That is, if an individual which has
received a transfer b when young does not save as adult in the best state ﬂ a,n e i t h e rs h e
does in any other state. Also note that, if ba > 0 exists for some a, then A2 and A5
imply that ￿ b(b,a) > 0 and ￿ bb(b,a) > 0 for all b>b a, according to Lemma 3.
2We are now ready to give a formal characterization of the result corresponding to
panel (a) of Fig. 1.
Proposition C.1. Under A2, A5 and A6. If ￿ b(bi,ﬂ a) <b i for all bi > 0,t h e
distribution of bi globally converges to a trivial stationary equilibrium.
Proof. First, note that A6, which says that Sﬂ a is non-empty, also implies that Sa
is non-empty. Moreover, recall ba >b ﬂ a > 0. Also recall that A2, A5 and A6 ensure
￿ b(b,a) > 0 and ￿ bb(b,a) > 0 for all b>b a, according to Lemma 3. Thus, Proposition
C.1 corresponds to the case in panel (a) of Fig. 1. From this ￿gure, it is clear that
there no stable set of the process ￿ b exists (recall De￿nition 2), and global convergence
to a trivial stationary equilibrium (recall De￿nition 1) is obvious.
To analyze more general situations than global convergence to a trivial stationary
equilibrium, the next assumption prevents in￿nite wealth accumulation of rich dynas-
ties.
A7. limb→∞￿ bb(b,a)=0for all a ∈ A.
Moreover, let Θa ≡ {b ∈ R++
ﬂ ﬂ
ﬂ￿ b(b,a)=b} be the set of strictly positive ￿xed points
of ￿ b(b,a), a ∈ A. In the remainder of this appendix, we focus on situations in which
Θa and Θﬂ a have the following properties.
A8. (i) Θa is non-empty.1 (ii) Θa and Θﬂ a are ￿nite. (iii) Let cﬂ a,d ﬂ a be two adjacent
elements of Θﬂ a such that cﬂ a <d ﬂ a and ￿ bb(dﬂ a,ﬂ a) ≤ 1. Then there exists ca ∈ Θa such
that ca ∈ (cﬂ a,d ﬂ a).( i v )L e tca,d a be two adjacent elements of Θa such that ca <d a and
￿ bb(da,a) ≥ 1.T h e nt h e r ee x i s t scﬂ a ∈ Θﬂ a such that cﬂ a ∈ (ca,d a).
<Figure 2>, <Figure 3>
It is easy to check that the case depicted in panel (b) of Fig. 1 is consistent with
A6-A8.2 Fig. 2 shows situations, which are consistent with A6 and A7, but inconsistent
1Note that, under A6, part (i) of A8 implies that Θﬂ a is non-empty as well.
2Note that part (iv) of A8 is not relevant for panel (b) of Fig. 1, since ￿ bb(da,a) < 1.
3with some parts of A8, whereas panels (a)-(c) of Fig. 3 are, like panel (b) of Fig. 1,
consistent with A6-A8.
Note that, by applying De￿nition 2, I3 and I6 in panels (a) and (b) of Fig. 3
are both stable sets, whereas in panel (c) I3 i st h eu n i q u es t a b l es e t . M o r e o v e r ,b y
replicating the arguments in Laitner (1981; section III), the following can be concluded
from Fig. 3, starting with panels (a) and (b). In panel (a) of Fig. 3, if bi
0 ∈ I2∪I3∪I4,
then limt→∞ Pr{bi
t ∈ I3} = 1. In panel (b), the same is true if bi
0 ∈ I2 ∪ I3.I np a n e l
(a), if bi
0 ∈ I6 ∪ I7,t h e nlimt→∞ Pr{bi
t ∈ I6} = 1. In panel (b), the same is true if
bi
0 ∈ I5∪I6∪I7. In both panels (a) and (b), if bi
0 ∈ I0,t h e nq ≡ limt→∞ Pr{bi
t =0 } = 1,
and, if bi
0 ∈ I1,t h e nq ∈ (0,1) and limt→∞ Pr{bi
t ∈ I3} = 1 − q. Finally, if bi
0 ∈ I5
in panel (a), then bi
t ∈ I3 or bi
t ∈ I6 with probability one. In panel (b), the same is
true if bi
0 ∈ I4. Now consider panel (c) of Fig. 3. If bi
0 ∈ I0 ∪ I1,t h e nq = 1.I f
bi
0 ∈ I2,t h e nq ∈ (0,1) and limt→∞ Pr{bi
t ∈ I3} = 1 − q. Finally, if bi
0 ∈ I3 ∪ I4,
then limt→∞ Pr{bi
t ∈ I3} = 1. Using this discussion, one can generalize the conclusions
drawn from panel (b) of Fig. 1 discussed in the main text, in the following sense.
Proposition C.2. Under A2, A5-A8. Let c =m i n Θﬂ a and d =m i n Θa (i.e.,
c<d ).
(i) For all bi
0 ∈ [0,c],a st →∞ , the distribution of bi
t converges to a locally stable
trivial stationary equilibrium.
(ii) For all bi
0 ∈ (c,d), there is a positive probability q ∈ (0,1) that the distribution
of bi
t converges to a trivial stationary equilibrium, whereas with probability 1 − q it
converges to a (unique and stable) stationary equilibrium on a stable set.
(iii) For all bi
0 ∈ [d,∞), the distribution of bi converges to a (unique and stable)
stationary equilibrium on a stable set.
Proof. Part (i) of Proposition C.2 can be deduced by similar arguments as in the
proof of Proposition C.1. To prove parts (ii) and (iii), recall De￿nitions 1 and 2 and
verify from A2 and A5 (which ensure ￿ b(b,a) > 0 and ￿ bb(b,a) > 0 for all b>b a)a sw e l l
as A6-A8, that the result can directly be deduced by replicating the discussion of Fig.
3a b o v e .
42 An Additional Example
The following example provides a simple illustration of the additional assumptions in
this supplement by specifying preferences, and discusses the some properties of the
analysis in the paper. Following Galor and Zeira (1993), Moav (2002) and Galor and





t+1)=( 1 − α)lnc
i
t+1 + αln(γ + b
i
t+1), 0 < α < 1, γ ≥ 0.( C . 2 )
It is easy to check that assumption A2 and thus Lemma 1 and 2 holds. Using the




t+1 − ϑ] if Ii
t+1 > ϑ ≡ γ(1 − α)/α and bi
t+1 =0
otherwise. Moreover, indirect utility is given by v(Ii
t+1)=2 l n ( Ii
t+1 + γ)+η,w h e r e
η ≡ αlnα +( 1 − α)ln(1 − α).T h u s ,t h ed e g r e eo fa b s o l u t er i s ka v e r s i o ni sg i v e nb y
A(I)=−v00(I)/v0(I)=1/(I +γ).T h a ti s ,A(I) is strictly decreasing in I, in line with
assumption A3. Hence, e0(b) > 0, according to Proposition 1, where e(b) is given by
Z
A
ﬂ whe(e,￿ a) − ﬂ R
ﬂ wh(e,￿ a)+ ﬂ R(b − e)+γ
dΦ(￿ a)=0 ,( C . 3 )
according to the ￿rst-order condition (A.3) for optimal educational investment. Using
(C.3), tedious derivations reveal that the sign of e00(b) is ambiguous, as in Appendix
B, lending some justi￿cation to |e00(b)| ≈ 0 (assumption A4). Regarding the short run,
this means that ￿ H0
1(ε) > 0 (Proposition 2) is likely to hold. For the remainder of this
supplement, suppose γ > 0, i.e., ϑ > 0. For the medium run and long run analysis,
using (10), one then obtains
b
i















where ba is given by ﬂ wh(e(ba),a)+ ﬂ R(ba − e(ba)) = ϑ, a ∈ A. Note that A5 implies that
ba is unique, and A6 implies that ba > 0.T h u s ,i fα
£
ﬂ wh(e(b),a)+ ﬂ R(b − e(b)) − ϑ
⁄
<b
5for all a ∈ A and for all b>0, Proposition C.1 applies, i.e., the distribution of bi globally
converges to a trivial stationary equilibrium. Moreover, it is easy to check that, under





1(b) < 0 for all b>b a, a ∈ A. (C.5)
Since b00(I)=0for I>ϑ under utility speci￿cation (A.8), ￿ b00
1(b) < 0 illustrates part
(i) of Lemma 4. Thus, the impact of higher equality on medium run growth is pos-
itive, according to part (i) of Proposition 3. For the long run analysis, note that
(C.5) is consistent with assumption A7. Moreover, if there exists a b>0 such that
α[ﬂ wh(e(b),a)+ ﬂ R(b − e(b))−ϑ]=b, i.e., if part (i) of A8 holds, (C.5) implies that also
parts (ii)-(iv) of A8 hold. This illustrates that, for the long run, the discussion of Fig.
1 in the main text applies (Proposition 4).
3 Increasing Variance of Earnings
The remainder of this supplement proves the following claim made in section 2.2.
Lemma C.2. If ha > 0 and hea > (<)0, then the variance of earnings is strictly
increasing (strictly decreasing) in the level of educational investment e.
Proof. Recall that earnings are given by ﬂ wh(e,￿ a). Denote the mean human capital




h(e,￿ a)dΦ(￿ a), (C.6)
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where ￿ a is de￿ned as the realization of ￿ a such that h(e,￿ a)=ﬂ h(e). Thus, according to
assumption ha > 0,t h e￿rst integral in (C.8) is negative, whereas the second integral
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h(e,￿ a) − ﬂ h(e)
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h(e,￿ a) − ﬂ h(e)
⁄
he(e,￿ a)dΦ(￿ a) (C.10)





h(e,￿ a) − ﬂ h(e)
⁄




h(e,￿ a) − ﬂ h(e)
⁄
he(e,￿ a)dΦ(￿ a). (C.11)
Since, the left-hand side of (C.11) is zero, according to (C.6), we have Σ0(e) > (<)0 iﬀ
hea > (<)0, according to (C.8) and (C.11). This proves Lemma C.2.
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Figure 3: Consistency with assumptions A6-A8. 
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(Figure 3 continued) 
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